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Measuring Welfare Changes from Commodity Price Stabilization: 
Case Study of Import Tariff in Indonesia’s Rice Market in 2001-
20051 
Rus’an Nasrudin2 
Abstract 
There has been an extensive debate on the role of government intervention in the rice 
market in Indonesia. The arguments have converged to the point where they agree that rice 
policy has reduced price variability, but there is no real consensus on the consequences for 
domestic welfare. The Indonesian government had used buffer stock scheme to stabilize 
rice price during 1963-1998 before liberalized the market only for one year in 1998-1999. 
Then trade policy has been implemented since 2001 by imposing an import tariff on rice. 
This new policy raises an interesting question on how much the welfare effects of the tariff 
on domestic welfare. Using partial equilibrium analysis, this paper analyses and estimate 
the welfare effects of rice price stabilization scheme using trade policy instruments during 
2001-2005 in which the open import period applies. The welfare equation developed by 
Coleman and Jones (1992) and Jones (1995a) as the extension of Newbery and Stiglitz 
(1981) approach are used to capture the effects of Indonesia’s rice price variability on 
domestic welfare. The estimates show that both hypothetical and actual stabilization 
schemes create aggregate domestic welfare loss which originates from consumption and 
production inefficiency. Within the aggregate result, it is also shown that the risk benefits 
are smaller than the fall in mean surplus for consumers and producers. Therefore, there is 
no support for the view that using trade policy to stabilize rice price provides risk benefit 
for consumers and producers. 
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1 Introduction 
Rice is the staple food in Indonesia. The importance of this commodity to the national 
economy has lead to government intervention. In its rice policy document, the Indonesian 
government states the aim to improve farmer’s welfare, to develop rural economy 
development, and to stabilize national economy3. In the economic point of view, one of the 
policy settings is to stabilize rice price domestically. There are two main instruments used 
to achieve price stabilization, STE’s (States Owned Enterprise) role and trade policy. 
In the past, the Indonesian government adopted price stabilization scheme through Bulog. 
Bulog is Indonesia’s State Trading Enterprise (STE) which was established in 1963 to 
maintain the availability of domestic food supply and stabilize prices (Bulog 2007). Its role 
is a domestic trader and a rice import monopolist. Bulog operates as a domestic trader that 
buys rice at the reference price/floor price during the harvest period and holds rice when the 
price is low and releases it when the price is high as well as imports rice if needed. It 
operates the buffer stock scheme to stabilize price (Sidik 2004:3). 
After the financial and economic crisis in 1997-98, the institutional arrangements have been 
changed. The role of Bulog as a rice import monopolist was abandoned in 1999. In January 
2000 the government introduced import tariff as the trade policy instrument to support price 
stabilization. However, Bulog still acts as a buffer stock scheme holder (Bulog 2007), and 
75 per cent of imports were conducted by Bulog (Leith et al. 2003:10). 
Jones (1995b) and Timmer (1996) examined price stabilization in the presence of Bulog’s 
role. Jones (1995b) focused on the storage scheme of price stabilization operated by Bulog 
to examine the welfare effects among consumers, producers and taxpayers. He revealed that 
the storage scheme reduces price variability both each year and between 1979-1991. 
However, he pointed out that the current storage scheme also raises growers’ risk share and 
their expected profit. Therefore, the increase in rice production is due to the latter factor 
                                                             
3 Indonesiancabinetsecretary, 2007. Kebijakan Perberasan (Rice Policy), Instruksi Presiden Republik 
Indonesia (Presidential Instruction), Deputi Sekretaris Bidang Hukum, Jakarta. This document can be 
accessed at http://www.bulog.co.id/inpres3.php.  
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rather the former. Furthermore, he argued that there be a potentially large welfare loss from 
price stabilization since it attracted resources from other productive activities. This 
argument is in line with Robinson et al. (1998) who found that there is inefficient resource 
allocation if the rice price is maintained by Bulog. That is when rice production increases 
and the exchange rate is devaluated. As it retains valuable resources in producing rice that 
would be more productive in other agriculture commodities.  
Similar to Jones, Timmer (1996) also found that the rice price was more stable during the 
1970s and 1980s as a result of domestic procurement and the buffer stock scheme operated 
by Bulog.  In contrast to Jones (1995b), he argues that a stable price creates macroeconomic 
benefits as it increases investment and supports the economic growth. In the situation where 
farmers increase investment due to lower risk and a more stable price. 
Warr (2005) discusses the rice policy and poverty. He analysed the impact of import bans 
on rice import using a general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy. He found that 
the import ban increases domestic prices but lowers return on unskilled labour and 
increases poverty. Thus he argues that protecting the rice sector or imposing trade barriers 
cannot be applied to reduce poverty. 
The general notion of superiority of free trade over restricted trade stimulates a test for rice 
trade policy’s impacts to welfare in Indonesia. Past discussions of Indonesia’s rice price 
policy had not focused on the measure of welfare impact from using a tariff to stabilize the 
rice price. This study uses the partial equilibrium analysis to examine the impacts of tariff 
on welfare during 2001-2005 when the government imposed the import tariff and open 
import policy. The estimate is obtained by employing the basic welfare equation introduced 
by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) where the welfare changes can be expressed as a function 
of trade policy instruments, commodity price variability and price elasticities of demand 
and supply. The hypothesis is whether partial the stabilization scheme associated with the 
tariff decreases domestic welfare or not. The result suggests that the trade policy scheme to 
stabilize rice has a cost to domestic welfare as it reduces the aggregate domestic welfare. 
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Also, the fall in mean surplus is greater than risk benefits generated by the scheme for 
consumers and producers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will elaborate the historical 
background and summarize the actual price outcomes of Indonesia’s rice price stabilization 
policy. Section 3 will cover a model of price stabilization in a small open economy used to 
link the trade policy instruments and social welfare. I begin with diagrammatical exposition 
to extract the intuition of the model followed by a formal analysis. Section 4 estimates both 
hypothetical and empirical welfare impacts of Indonesia’s rice policy on the domestic 
surplus and conducts a sensitivity analysis of these results. The final section will offer a 
conclusion and implication.  
2 Indonesia’s rice price policy 
Indonesia’s rice price policy is part of a broader current policy which aims to improve 
farmers’ welfare, food security, rural economic development and national economic 
stability4. One important reason for the government to intervene the rice sector is due to its 
importance in domestic consumption and production. Millions of people are engaged in the 
cultivating, producing and post harvesting process of rice.  Also rice is the staple food for 
Indonesian people and accounts for a large portion of people’s daily food consumption. 
Warr (2005:459) suggests that domestic rice consumption accounts for 7.2 per cent of 
people’s average daily consumption. Indonesia’s rice policy has been evolving in three 
general stabilization schemes: the buffer-stock scheme, the free trade period and the trade 
policy scheme. 
Buffer-stock scheme operated by Bulog (1963-1998) 
The form of Bulog’s operation to achieve these objectives is to act as the commodity import 
monopolist and also as the domestic commodity trader using storage instruments. It 
releases the commodity in the market whenever the commodity price is high and imports it 
if domestic demand exceeds production. It will operate the opposite way if the price is low. 
                                                             
4 It stated in the Presidency Instruction of No.3/2007  
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For the period, Bulog as Perjan (non-profit state owned enterprise) operates as a public 
services rather than a profit oriented institution. As a consequence, Bulog has absorbed the 
government budget for its operational costs. After the financial crisis in 1997-98, the heavy 
burden from Bulog’s operation on the government budget and trade liberalization issues 
forced the government to take an institutional reform on the status of Bulog. As a result, its 
role as the rice import monopolist was abandoned in 2000. There has been a new 
institutional arrangement for Bulog to became Perum5(Bulog 2007). In this period, Bulog is 
a mixture of public service and profit oriented institution. In this new arrangement, Bulog 
holds the price stabilization function with storage instrument accompanied by the role of 
the private institution. Between 1998-99 the sector had experienced no intervention in the 
market. 
Trade policy scheme (2000-2005) 
In addition to Bulog’s rule, starting in January 2000 the government set trade policy by 
imposing two trade barrier instruments, import tariff and ‘seasonal’ import ban. This 
indicates that trade liberalization of this sector was abandoned. In operating this policy, the 
government delivered the mandate to Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Trade. The 
Ministry of Finance manages the import tariff revenue, and The Ministry of Trade 
administers the licenses and regulations of import.  
Since January 2000 a specific tariff on rice imports has been imposed at the rate of 
Rp430/kg. This was increased to Rp450/kg in January 2004 and raised again to Rp550/kg 
in August 20076. In addition, the ‘seasonal’ import ban defined as a period of prohibiting 
the import of rice in one month before and after the harvesting period was introduced in 
January 2004 to control a downward pressure on the rice price. However, the 
implementation of this policy is in question since the government operates it behind the 
scene/non-explicit policy. According to Warr (2005), this import ban would not be effective 
if it is anticipated. The importers would store the rice before ban period, expecting benefit 
                                                             
5 Perum stands for Perusahaan Umum, which defined as business unit that operates for public services but 
internally it manages the corporate like private business. So it is not purely non-profit institution as Perjan. 
6 Stated in Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation), various relases. 
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from the higher price in the ban period. Thus, there will only be small increase in the rice 
price in the presence of the import ban.  
Aside from these two main policies, the government has also been implementing direct 
subsidy for the poor. The economic and financial crisis in 1997-98 had increased the 
number people who are living in poverty category. Therefore, the government considered 
assisted the poor household with a direct subsidy on rice commodity. In the early stage of 
the program, it took the form of market operations, called OPK (operasi pasar 
khusus/special market operation). OPK provided the voucher-like system by lowering the 
price for low income family. They can buy rice for Rp1000/kg and are rationed up to 20kg 
per family each month. In 2002, the name was changed to Raskin (beras untuk rakyat 
miskin/rice for poor people) to overcome the miss targeting problem. This program in the 
sense of reducing poor household’s consumption expenditure was effective. However, the 
miss targeting (not the true poor people as the beneficiaries) is still the main problem of this 
direct subsidy due to lack of accurate socio-economic data held by the responsible 
ministries.   
Indonesia’s rice price variability 
Under free trade, international rice price fluctuations will be transmitted to domestic price 
changes. These fluctuations will lead to variability of domestic welfare. The consumer 
surplus will be lower, and at the same time, the producer surplus will be higher when the 
price is high. The opposite condition applies when the price is low. Thus, price variability 
shifts the surplus between agents in the economy. 
In the absence of insurance policy, the producers (farmers) favour price stability to reduce 
risks from fluctuations in rice price and production (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). Similarly, 
consumers also prefer certainty in their consumption bundles despite price variability which 
creates higher transactions costs (Timmer 1996). Hence, the government may intervene in 
the market to stabilize the price to eliminate these risks. Furthermore, it can put different 
distributional weight to achieve certain distributional objectives between agents. 
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Since 2000, the government has stabilized the rice price using trade policy instrument. The 
government has imposed a tariff on rice imports since 2000 at the rate of Rp430/kg which 
increased to Rp550 in 2007. Despite the fact that Bulog still holds the domestic buffer-stock 
role which accounts for 75 per cent of rice import volume (Sawit 2006 and Leith et al. 
2003), I may be arguing that the current price stabilization scheme be trade policy 
combined with the buffer stock scheme operated by Bulog. If we point the stabilization 
instrument only to tariff, it is incomplete as the government would need subsidy when 
international price rice is high. In the absence of explicit subsidy, I assume that actually the 
government subsidized rice through Bulog.   
Figure 1 International and domestic price of rice: Indonesia 2001-2005 
Source: IRRI for the international price and can be accessed at 
http://www.irri.org/science/ricestat/pdfs/WRS2005-Table18.pdf and CEIC database for the domestic price. 
Figure 1 shows that between 2001-2005 the domestic price remained stable with a slight 
increase in the first quarter of 2002. At the same time, the international price has fluctuated 
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below domestic price except since the first quarter of 2004. This gives the impression that 
variability in the domestic price is less than the international price.  
For the entire period, the data shows that the government has stabilized the price at certain 
bands which were 17 per cent from the maximum possible price and 36 per cent from the 
minimum possible price. It reduced the maximum domestic price by 17 per cent from 
Rp4311/kg to Rp3594/kg. It increased the minimum domestic price by 36 per cent from 
Rp1918/kg to Rp2601/kg. Simultaneously, the mean domestic price increased by 14 per 
cent from Rp2654/kg to Rp3034/kg.  
Over the 5-year period, the average standard deviation of the domestic price was Rp374/kg 
lower than the international price. The scheme reduced the price variability from Rp602/kg 
to Rp228/kg measured in standard deviation term. This is also a sign of a 62 per cent 
reduction in domestic price variability as illustrated in Figure 1. The statistical summary of 
Indonesia’s rice price data is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 International and domestic price of rice statistical summary: Indonesia Jan 
2001-Apr 2005 
Statistical Summary International Rice Price Domestic Rice Price 
Mean 2654.5 3034.1 
Standard deviation 602.1 228.3 
Variance  362,562.9   52,119.9  
Maximum 4311.1 3593.6 
Minimum 1918.6 2601.8 
Source: IRRI for international price and CEIC database for domestic price, recalculated. 
The higher domestic compared to international rice price for this period also was observed 
by Sidik (2004). He revealed that in 2004 the government changed the reference price for 
paddy from Rp1500/kg to Rp1700/kg. With this new reference, the price of milled rice also 
increased to Rp2750/kg. The real retail price in the market was slightly higher, which was 
Rp3031/kg7.  
                                                             
7 Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesian Bureau of Statistic). 
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These data indicate that the government operated the partial stabilization scheme. I infer 
this from the data that the government maintained the domestic price at certain bands 
within international price fluctuation. In addition, we may interpret the scheme as the price 
support scheme as it keeps the mean domestic price higher than the international mean 
price. The fact that domestic prices deviated from international price confirms the 
hypothesis that the government might have intervened in the rice market using trade policy 
and or a buffer stock scheme.  
Price variability may reflect interactions of many factors within the economy. Newbery and 
Stiglitz (1981) suggest that the source of price variability can be a market and non-market 
risk. To simplify the analysis, accordingly, will assume this price variability was generated 
by market risk solely and does not account for non-market risk such as harvest condition.  
3 Model of price stabilization and welfare changes 
Diagrammatic exposition of welfare effects under complete stabilization in a 
small open economy 
There are a number of stabilization scheme: a reference price scheme, a price band scheme 
and a minimum price scheme (Coleman and Jones 1992:5). The reference price scheme is 
where the government sets a target price. Whenever the trade policy instruments such as 
import tariff and import subsidy are imposed, they move domestic price to this reference 
price. A price band scheme is more flexible as it allows some deviation in domestic price. It 
specifies the upper and lower bounds on the domestic price, not the exact target value. A 
minimum price scheme is the stabilization scheme aimed to stop the price from falling 
below a certain level. It might be applicable for protecting producers as argued by many 
governments in developing economies by stabilizing agricultural price commodity using 
this scheme. 
First, I consider the hypothetical model of complete stabilization scheme in which the 
government tries to meet the target at the reference price of its mean ( p ) as used in 
Coleman and Jones (1992). Indeed, this scheme is not the representation of the current 
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policy setting; I use it to start extracting the intuition for the general stabilization scheme 
and to compare the magnitude of welfare effects with the actual scheme. Then, I examine 
the price band scheme or the partial stabilization scheme in the subsequent part which is 
indicated by the data used in the previous section to measure the actual welfare effects. 
To show the welfare changes for three groups in the economy: consumers, producers and 
taxpayers, this stabilization framework can be explained using a price-quantity diagram of 
domestic rice market in partial equilibrium setting. The intuition behind complete 
commodity price stabilization is explained using Figure 2.  
Figure 2 Welfare effects of complete commodity price stabilization 
 
I assume, for simplicity, the world rice price rises to Hp with probability 0.5 and falls to 
Lp with probability 0.5. When prices rise to Hp , the government subsidizes imports by s to 
lower the domestic price to p  and in contrast, when it falls to Lp , the government imposes a 
tariff on imports t to raise the domestic price to p . The scheme completely stabilize the 
price at its reference price, p as well as the surplus among groups. This price intervention 
will induce resource reallocation in the market which in turn results in welfare changes for 
each group in the economy. 
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There are two exclusive changes in welfare under this scheme: the change in expected (or 
mean) domestic surplus and the change in the variance of domestic surplus. Denoting x and 
y as consumers and producers’ surplus, respectively, when the price stabilized at its mean, 
Table 2 identifies the changes in domestic surplus for each group in the economy. The 
detailed derivations of the variance in surplus are presented in Appendix A. 
Table 2 Changes in domestic surplus under complete rice price stabilization at its 
mean 
Agent Surplus-Without scheme 
Surplus-With 
scheme 
Change8 
Consumers:    
At Hp  ( )x j a b    x  ( )j a b   
At Lp  ( )x k d e f   
 
x
 
( )k d e f   
 
Mean x c x f    x  c f    
S.D. j a b c    0 ( )j a b c     
Producers:    
At Hp  ( )y j a   y  ( )j a   
At Lp  y k  y  k  
Mean y a y d    y  a d    
S.D. j  0 j  
Tax payers:    
At Hp  0 ( )a b c e      e  
At Lp  0 e  e  
Mean 0
 
0 0 
S.D. 0
 e  e  
The last column in Table 2 summarizes that the complete stabilization reduces the mean 
surplus for both consumers and taxpayers. Consumers will gain additional area equal to 
c under the diagram above of their expected surplus in the absence of the stabilization 
scheme. The producers are also potentially better off by the additional area equal to a when 
the government allows for free trade. In contrast, there is no welfare change between with 
and without stabilization scheme for taxpayers. Their average surplus is zero when the 
                                                             
8 It is potential surplus loss by stabilization (surplus when price is stabilized minus surplus when price 
fluctuates). 
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government imposes the tariff and the subsidy on trade which is equal to their average 
surplus when free trade is allowed. 
On the other hand, as the stabilization scheme has a disadvantage of reducing the mean 
surplus at least for consumers and producers, the scheme also generates benefits by 
reducing the mean variation for these two agents. The stabilization scheme removes the 
price uncertainty in the rice market as well as the fluctuation in the consumers and 
producers’ surplus. I account for this benefit as the risk benefits for risk adverse individuals 
in the economy from commodity price stabilization (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:69-73). 
The net welfare changes will be determined by the sum of changes in the mean surplus and 
this risk benefits. 
In line with Timmer (1996), consumers and producers favour price stability as it increases 
their expected utility. Price variability creates uncertainty for consumption and production 
planning. However, the scheme has the opposite effect on variance in the surplus for 
taxpayers. Taxpayers face uncertainty whether they should pay the subsidy costs or receive 
tariff revenue through the government budget in the presence of the scheme. Thus, these 
effects indicate that the stabilization scheme essentially shifts the risks associated with price 
variability from consumers and producers to taxpayers.  
The net domestic welfare change is summarized in Table 3. As a result of these changes in 
the surplus of each group, the stabilization scheme decreases the mean domestic surpluses 
and leaves the surplus variance unchanged. This occurs as the variability in surplus is 
transferred from consumers and producers to taxpayers between the two schemes. So both 
schemes have the same magnitude of surplus variability, which is the area e . 
12 
 
Table 3  Summary of changes in aggregate domestic surplus under complete price 
stabilization at its mean 
Net Changes Surpluses-Without scheme 
Surpluses-With 
scheme 
Change 
At Hp  x y b   x y e   ( )e b a c      
At Lp  
x y d e f
x y d a b c f
   
        
x y e   ( )d f   
Mean 
x y d f
x y a c
  
   
 x y  ( ) ( )a c d f      
S.D. e a b c    e  0 
Diagrammatic exposition of welfare effects under partial stabilization in a small 
open economy 
Figure 3 Welfare effects of partial commodity price stabilization 
(i) 
 
(ii) 
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When the partial stabilization is undertaken, it allows the domestic price to fluctuate in 
lower magnitude than the international price. It implies that the variability of surplus 
associated with the price band is removed partially by the scheme. This band is Lp - Hp that 
lies within the international price variation of Lp - Hp in Figure 3. It is argued by Newbery 
and Stiglitz (1981) that many governments adopt this scheme instead of the complete 
stabilization scheme as it a high-cost operation. It is also difficult to have the full 
stabilization scheme in the long-run. Table 4 identifies the welfare changes for each group 
in the economy using two graphs in Figure 3. Figure 3 (i) is used to observe the welfare 
changes for consumers and producers, while Figure 3 (ii) is used for taxpayers. The detailed 
computation and formal derivations of the variance surplus are presented in Appendix B. 
Table 4 Changes in domestic surplus under partial rice price stabilization  
Agent Surplus-Without scheme Surplus-With scheme Change 
Consumers:    
Mean x c x f    2 1x c x f    1 2c f    
S.D. j b a   1 1 1j b a   2 2 2( )j b a    
Producers:    
Mean y a y d    2 1y a y d    1 2a d    
S.D. j  2 1j j  2 1j j   
Tax payers:    
Mean 0
 z x  z x  
S.D. 0
 x y y z    x y y z    
The partial stabilization scheme results in similar effects with the complete stabilization 
scheme, except for the increase in the mean surplus of taxpayers. Like the former scheme, it 
reduces both the mean surplus and the variance surplus. However, as the scheme only 
partially removes the price uncertainty, it has a lower impact on the welfare change of 
consumers and producers. The fall in the mean surplus from this scheme is a fraction of the 
fall in the mean surplus from the previous scheme. This is demonstrated by the smaller 
triangles of 1a and 1c in Figure 3 compared to triangles of a and c in Figure 2. 
The main difference is the change in the taxpayers’ mean surplus. With the partial 
stabilization scheme, the average tariff revenue and the subsidy cost is not zero. Taxpayers 
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would receive a larger amount of the tariff revenue than the subsidy payment through the 
government budget as import level is higher when the price is low compared to when the 
price is high. Its average is equal to the small area of x z  in the graph above.  
Interestingly, both schemes not only hold the surplus variance unchanged as it is a surplus 
shift from consumers and producers to taxpayers but also have the same mean variance. 
The net domestic surplus variance with and without the schemes are the same, area e . 
When the government chooses the partial stabilization instead of the complete stabilization 
scheme, it only shifts the surplus variability of the same range into a lower level. So, we 
may expect that it will result in a lower surplus mean variance with the same standard 
deviation as in the complete stabilization scheme. Table 5 summarizes the changes in 
domestic surplus under this scheme.  
Table 5  Summary of changes in domestic surplus under partial rice price stabilization  
Net 
Changes 
Surpluses-Without 
scheme 
Surpluses-With scheme Change 
At Hp  x y b   2 1( )x y b h b i      ( )h i   
At Lp  x y d e f     
1 1 1( ) ( )x y d e f x y z
x y d e f l m
      
        
( ) ( )l m h i    
 
Mean 
x y a c
x y d f
  
   
 x y a c h i      ( )h i   
S.D. e  e  0 
Welfare effects of price stabilization  
Following Coleman and Jones (1992) and Jones (1995a) I derive the formal analysis of the 
welfare effect from price stabilization using consumers’ maximization problem to express 
the welfare changes as a function of price variability. The welfare effects which are 
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explained diagrammatically in the previous section can be derived formally as follows. The 
maximization problem under partial equilibrium setting is9: 
Max 0( )EU x s.t. py qx -without stabilization; and 
Max 1( )EU x s.t. py m qx  -with stabilization 
Notation: 
x -is consumption of rice without stabilization 
0( )EU x -is the expected utility over the consumption of rice without stabilization 
Wp p -is the price of rice without stabilization scheme which is world price  
y -is rice production without stabilization 
py -is the net income of individuals from profit and input owner in the absence of 
stabilization 
q -consumer price of rice without stabilization 
x -is consumption of rice with stabilization 
1( )EU x -is expected utility over the consumption of rice without stabilization 
Wp p   -is domestic price of rice which is stabilized at its reference price 
y -is rice production with stabilization 
py m -is the net income of individuals from profit and input owner plus any tariff 
revenue or subsidy payment when m is net import 
q -consumer price of rice with stabilization at its reference price 
 
After solving these consumer problems, we obtain the indirect utility functions: 
                                                             
9 The author leaves the possible extension for general equilibrium approach for further work. The basic 
framework for this approach is cited in the Appendix D for reference purposes. 
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0 0( , ( ))EV p I p -without price stabilization and, 
1 1( , ( , ) )EV p I p B  -with price stabilization, where B is the amount of utility measured in 
money income term that consumers are willing to pay for reduced price variability. 
B is the amount that makes the indirect utility with and without stabilization equal 
(Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, cited in Coleman and Jones 1992:10). After a Taylor series 
expansion around the reference price, the aggregate change in the producer, consumer and 
producer surplus can be estimated using the expression10: 
(1)  2 2 20
0
( ) ( ) 1
( )
2
qt
I
V t V q R
B m
V I
 

   ,  
The first term is the welfare change due to efficiency loss represented by a fall in the mean 
surplus. This is an area ( ) ( )a c d f     with complete stabilization and area ( )h i   
with partial stabilization. The second term is the risk-benefit gain of stabilization which is 
in aggregate equal to zero as 2 2
p t  . This is a transfer of risk between consumers-
producers and taxpayers. For each group, I take into account this risk benefit term when I 
assume that individuals are risk averse with 0R  . 
Complete stabilization scheme 
With reference to equation (1), now we can formally express the welfare of consumers, 
producers and taxpayers for a level of price variability explained diagrammatically in the 
previous section plus the risk benefit terms as : 
(i) consumers: 
(2) 
2
2 2 2
0
1 1
( )
2 2
qcomplete
C C q q
R
W W x
I

 

     
(ii) producers: 
                                                             
10 The formal derivation of this expression is presented in Appendix C. 
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(3) 
2
2 2 2
0
1 1
( )
2 2
pcomplete
P P p p
R
W W y
I

 

     
(iii) taxpayers: 
(4) 2 2
0
1
( ( 0))
2
complete
T
R
W m
I
    
The second terms in the consumers and producers welfare expressions are areas of 
c f and a d in Table 1, respectively. These are the potential welfare loss for each group 
from the complete stabilization scheme. 
Notation: 
CW -consumer surplus when the price is completely stabilized at its mean and it corresponds 
to an area x in Figure 1 
PW -producer surplus when the price is completely stabilized at its mean and it correspond 
to the area y in Figure 1 
2
q -consumer price variance without stabilization and it corresponds to international price 
variance 
2
q -consumer price variance with complete stabilization and it equals to zero 
2
p -producer price variance without stabilization 
2
p -producer price variance with complete stabilization 
x -mean of rice consumption 
y -mean of rice production 
 -absolute slope of the supply schedule ( p
y


) 
 -absolute slope of the demand schedule ( q
x


) 
0I -each group’s income which is equal to total expenditure 
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R-the coefficient of relative risk aversion11 
Subsequently, we can define the welfare changes as surplus with complete stabilization 
minus surplus without stabilization scheme for each group. Denoting B as these welfare 
changes, we have12: 
(i) consumers: 
(2a) 
2
2 2
0
1 1
( )
2 2
qcomplete
C q
R
B x
I



    
(ii) producers: 
(3a) 
2
2 2
0
1 1
( )
2 2
pcomplete
P p
R
B y
I



    
(iii) taxpayers: 
(4a) 2 2
0
1
2
complete
T
R
W m
I
   
These are the expressions for the mean surplus changes in the last column of Table 1 
combined with risk benefit terms. Then, the aggregate welfare change is obtained by 
combining these welfare change measures which can be expressed as: 
(5) 
2 2
1 1
2 2
q pcompleteB
 
 
   13 
This is the formal expression for the domestic mean surplus change of area 
( ) ( )a c d f     identified in the last column of Table 2 when the risk benefit terms sum 
to zero. This occurs as it is essential risks transfer between consumers-producers and 
                                                             
11 The formal derivation of coefficient of relative risk aversion is presented in Appendix B.2. 
12 These expressions are obtained by noting that the price variability under complete stabilization is zero 
with 0p q   . 
13 Actually there should be covariance terms when we are aggregating the risk terms of consumers, producers 
and taxpayers. However, in the absence of insurance market they cannot trade risk which means that we can 
ignore these terms. The working for the covariance terms is presented in Appendix A.5. 
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taxpayers. Thus, the welfare changes are the consumption and production inefficiencies due 
to tariff and or subsidy.  
 
Partial stabilization scheme  
The welfare changes from partial price stabilization can be derived in a similar manner to 
the complete stabilization scheme. However, it should have a smaller effect on both groups’ 
and the aggregate welfare changes. The mean surplus falls in a smaller magnitude than the 
complete stabilization. The only different feature is that 2 0q  since the partial scheme 
only reduces price variability instead of removes it completely. The welfare of consumers, 
producers and taxpayers for a level of price variability can be expressed as: 
(i) consumers: 
(6) 
2 2
2 2 2
0
( )1 1
( )
2 2C
q qpartial
C q q
R
W W x
I
 
 


     
(ii) producers: 
(7) 
2 2
2 2 2
0
( )1 1
( )
2 2
p ppartial
P P p p
R
W W y
I
 
 


     
(iii) taxpayers: 
(8) 
2 2
0
1 1
( ) ( ( 0))
2 2T
partial
L H
R
W m m m
I
      
Thus, changes in domestic surplus for consumers, producers and taxpayers using the same 
concept as complete stabilization scheme are: 
(i) consumers: 
(6a) 
2 2
2 2 2
0
( )1 1
( )
2 2
q qpartial
C q q
R
B x
I
 
 


     
(ii) producers: 
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(7a) 
2 2
2 2 2
0
( )1 1
( )
2 2P
p ppartial
p p
R
B y
I
 
 


     
(iii) taxpayers: 
(8a) 2 2
0
1 1
( )
2 2
partial
T L H
R
B m m m
I
     
The aggregate welfare change as the combined welfare changes from these three groups in 
the economy is: 
(9) 
2 2( ) ( )1 1
2 2
q q p ppartialB
   
 
 
    
Again, the risk terms are collapsed as they are a transfer of risk from consumers and 
producers to taxpayers. 
4 Estimation of welfare effects on domestic surplus 
Now we can estimate the change of welfare for these three group effects using equations 
2a, 3a and 4a for complete stabilization and equations 6a, 7a and 8a for partial stabilization 
by applying monthly data of prices, production, consumption, and import of rice. First, we 
consider within year price variability to capture the welfare effects in each year then we 
estimate the impact over the 5-year period. 
I use the international rice price data from International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and 
adjust it using nominal exchange rate from Bank Indonesia. The domestic rice price, the 
level of rice consumption and production are obtained from CEIC database. The 
approximation measure of each group income which is equal to total expenditure is 
obtained from the market value of domestic expenditure on rice. I assume that each group 
has the same mean income. Warr (2005:429) indicates that rice consumption in Indonesia 
accounts for 7.2 per cent of individual’s total expenditure based on Indonesia’s national 
account. 
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To compute the welfare changes estimates, I assume some parametrical values. It is clear 
that the welfare effects are also influenced by the slope of demand and supply schedules 
and the rate of relative risk aversion coefficient in addition to price variability. Here I adopt 
the parameter values in Jones (1995a) which is summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6  Price elasticities and coefficient of relative risk aversion 
Parameter Value assigned 
x -the own price elasticity of demand for rice -0.40 
x -the own price elasticity of supply for rice 0.47 
R-coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 
The first step is to compute the slope of the demand and supply schedule using the domestic 
level of consumption, production and prices. Here I use the actual/stabilized data to 
compute these slopes. The computation results and data summary are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7  Slope of demand and supply schedules and domestic level of consumption and 
production  
Year β α 
Domestic 
Consumption (MTs) 
Domestic Production 
(MTs) 
Domestic Price 
(Rp/MTs) 
2001 0.13 0.11   51,162,220.00             50,460,800.00  2,702,015.59  
2002 0.15 0.13         52,186,660.00           51,489,700.00                 3,131,501.79  
2003 0.14 0.13          52,917,760.00         52,137,600.00                 3,067,322.79  
2004 0.14 0.12            54,767,750.00          54,088,470.00                 3,068,523.64  
2005 0.17 0.14            54,670,890.00          53,984,590.00                 3,614,753.89  
The estimates of welfare effects under complete stabilization scheme 
Under complete stabilization scheme, the price variability would be zero when price is 
stabilized at its mean and equal to world price variability when there is no stabilization. 
Using the international price variability, Table 8 summarizes the annual estimates of the 
welfare effects if the government chooses the complete stabilization scheme for each group 
in the economy.  
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Table 8  Welfare benefits under complete price stabilization14  
 Consumers Producers Taxpayers 
Year Mean 
Surplus  
Risk 
Benefit 
Net 
Change 
Mean 
Surplus  
Risk 
Benefit 
Net 
Change 
Mean 
Surplus  
Risk 
Benefit 
Net 
Change 
2001 -0.061 0.011 -0.050 -0.071 0.011 -0.060 0 -0.000002 -0.00002 
2002 -0.017 0.003 -0.014 -0.020 0.003 -0.017 0 -0.000001 -0.00001 
2003 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 0 0.000000 0.00000 
2004 -0.285 0.051 -0.233 -0.334 0.051 -0.284 0 -0.000008 -0.00008 
2005 -0.025 0.004 -0.020 -0.029 0.004 -0.025 0 -0.000001 -0.00001 
Average -0.079 0.014 -0.065 -0.092 0.014 -0.078 0 -0.000002 -0.00002 
The average net welfare changes are negatives for all groups as shown in the last row of 
Table 8. This result shows that both consumers and producers mean surplus fall by the 
complete stabilization scheme. In addition, the risk benefits are smaller than the mean 
surplus effect. Therefore, the net benefit or net welfare change is negative. The negative 
risk-benefit for taxpayers is significantly lower than that for consumers and producers. This 
may indicate that the scheme would not generate high variability for taxpayer’s surplus 
which is also uncertainty from paying subsidy or receiving tariff revenue of the scheme. 
The estimates of welfare effects under partial stabilization scheme 
The estimates for partial stabilization scheme may reflect the actual condition of 
Indonesia’s rice policy. As noted in the second part, the data shows that the government 
might have stabilized price at a certain range so that the domestic price variance is within 
the international price variance. Table 9 summarizes the estimate of welfare effects from 
partial price stabilization.  
                                                             
14 The mean benefits for consumers and taxpayers are computed as a percentage of market value of domestic 
rice consumption, while the benefits for producers are computed as percentage of market value of domestic 
rice production. 
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Table 9  Welfare benefits under partial price stabilization15  
 Consumers Producers Taxpayers 
Year Mean 
Surplus  
Risk 
Benefit 
Net 
Change 
Mean 
Surplus  
Risk 
Benefit 
Net 
Change 
Mean 
Surplus  
Risk 
Benefit 
Net 
Change 
2001 -0.014 0.008 -0.006 -0.016 0.008 -0.008 0.0049 -0.000001 0.004795 
2002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.0008 0.000000 0.002375 
2003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0001 0.000000 -0.000315 
2004 -0.230 0.051 -0.179 -0.267 0.051 -0.216 0.0156 -0.000008 0.012629 
2005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.0019 0.000001 -0.001583 
Average -0.050 0.011 -0.039 -0.058 0.011 -0.047 0.0039 -0.000002 0.003580 
 
Last row in Table 9 confirms that the magnitudes of welfare effects from the partial 
stabilization scheme are lower than the complete stabilization scheme. In average, the mean 
surplus for consumers and producers fall by 0.05 per cent and 0.058 per cent respectively. 
These figures are slightly lower than the fall in a mean surplus of consumers and producers 
under complete stabilization scheme, which are 0.079 per cent and 0.092 per cent 
respectively. The interesting feature is a positive net welfare change for taxpayers. This 
occurs as the risk benefits are insignificant compared to gain from average surplus change. 
Under the partial scheme, the risk benefits sign is reversed as the case in 2005. This 
indicates that at those times the scheme could not generate lower domestic price variability 
than the international price. Consequently, the surplus variability generates uncertainty 
which is, in turn, reduces utility as reflected by the negative risks benefit terms. 
Finally, the aggregate welfare effects for both schemes can be estimated based on equations 
5 and equation 9. They measure the domestic welfare changes as a result of efficiency loss 
from consumption and production by distortionary tariff and or subsidy. At the same time, 
the risk benefits for consumers and producers are transferred to taxpayers. Therefore, they 
are equal to zero. Table 10 presents the aggregate welfare effects for both schemes. 
                                                             
15 The result is obtained using similar manner as the complete stabilization scheme. 
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Table 10  Aggregate welfare effects of rice price stabilization  
Year Complete price stabilization Partial price stabilization 
2001 -0.133 -0.030 
2002 -0.038 -0.002 
2003 -0.013 0.000 
2004 -0.623 -0.503 
2005 -0.054 -0.009 
Average -0.172 -0.109 
There is no support for aggregate welfare gain from the price stabilization scheme which 
was using tariff and/or subsidy. The price stabilization scheme reduces domestic welfare as 
indicated by negative signs of these aggregate welfare effects, even though as per group 
effects, it might have positive welfare gain, particularly for consumers and producers if the 
risk benefits are large enough to outweigh the fall in mean surplus. Moreover, this 
conclusion is valid under the assumption that all individuals in the economy have the same 
R.  
Furthermore, I interpret these estimates of risk benefits as the upper bound level of the 
value. This is because under Newbery and Stiglitz approach I assume that all the risk is 
non-diversifiable and agents in the economy have no way to insure against risk. In practice, 
it is not the case as related agricultural commodities can be used to split risk for example by 
rotating the crop. However, the second assumption is a sensible statement for many 
developing countries including Indonesia where the public insurance system is not well 
developed (Jones 1995). 
A sensitivity analysis of parameter values in the welfare equation  
The parameter values assumed in this estimates play an important role in determining the 
size of welfare changes. I show the effect of changing each parameter values used to the 
estimate the welfare changes. To find circumstances when the complete stabilization 
scheme generates net welfare gain from risk benefits, I can conduct two possible exercises. 
The first is to increase risk benefit term by increasing R. The second is to lower the size of 
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fall in mean surplus by lowering the elasticities.  Table 11 presents the sensitivity analysis 
for two possible scenarios: doubling coefficient relative risk aversion (R) and halving 
elasticity ( ).  
Table 11  Sensitivity analysis for complete stabilization 
Welfare terms Base Doubling R Halving  
 Consumers 
Average Mean -0.079 -0.079 -0.039 
Average Risk 0.014 0.028 0.014 
Average Net -0.065 -0.051 -0.025 
 Producers 
Average Mean -0.092 -0.092 -0.046 
Average Risk 0.014 0.028 0.014 
Average Net -0.078 -0.064 -0.032 
 Taxpayers 
Average Risk -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000004 
Halving  has a greater effect in lowering average net welfare change than doubling R. 
Overall; the exercises show that the signs for net welfare changes are unchanged. There are 
two circumstances where the sign is changed. First, is when the value of R is greater than 
5.64 for consumers and 6.57 for producers given the initial value of . Second, is when the 
price elasticities of demand and supply are less than 0.07 using the initial value of R also 
result in positive welfare change. 
A similar approach as for the complete stabilization scheme, the results of sensitivity 
analysis for the partial stabilization scheme are summarized in Table 12. 
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Table 12  Sensitivity analysis for the partial stabilization 
Welfare terms Base Halving R Halving  
 Consumers 
Average Mean -0.050 -0.050 -0.025 
Average Risk 0.011 0.022 0.011 
Average Net -0.039 -0.028 -0.014 
 Producers 
Average Mean -0.058 -0.058 -0.029 
Average Risk 0.011 0.022 0.011 
Average Net -0.047 -0.036 -0.018 
 Taxpayers 
Average Mean 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Average Risk -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000004 
Average Net 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
The results show no difference with the complete stabilization scheme. Either by doubling 
R or halving  does not change the sign of net average welfare change. In addition, 
reducing the value of  also has larger impact than increasing R under the partial 
stabilization scheme. The critical value to change the sign of net welfare change by 
increasing R is when its value is greater than 4.54 for consumers and 5.27 for producers. If 
I lower the value of , the critical points are 0.08 for price elasticity of demand and 0.09 for 
price elasticity of supply. 
Finally, the sensitivity analysis is applied to the aggregate welfare changes. For both 
schemes, only halving  affects net welfare changes. In contrast halving R has no effect on 
net welfare changes. This result is not surprising as the aggregate welfare changes are only 
determined by the mean surplus terms, while the risk benefits terms are equal to zero. We 
may infer that lower elasticities correspond to lower aggregate welfare changes. This is the 
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case as the size of potential welfare loss is determined by the responsiveness of activity due 
to price changes which is reflected by the value of price elasticity.  
Table 13  Sensitivity analysis for aggregate welfare changes 
Scheme Base Doubling R Halving  
Complete stabilization -0.172 -0.172 -0.086 
Partial stabilization -0.109 -0.109 -0.054 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this study, I use the welfare equations developed by Coleman and Jones (1992) and 
Jones (1995a) to measure the welfare changes from rice price stabilization in Indonesia. I 
examine two possible schemes: the hypothetical complete stabilization scheme and the 
actual partial stabilization scheme associated with tariff and or subsidy on the import of 
rice. I apply the partial stabilization scheme after observing the actual variability of 
Indonesia’s rice price between 2001-2005 to measure the actual welfare effects of tariff 
scheme. The data shows that domestic price variability lies within international price 
variability which supports the argument for assessing the current policy setting as partial 
stabilization scheme.  
For consumers and producers, the stabilization scheme reduces their mean surplus as the 
expected surplus in the absence of tariff is greater than the expected surplus in the presence 
of tariff. By assuming that individuals are risk averse, the stabilization scheme using tariff 
instruments also creates risk benefits as it eliminates (complete stabilization) or reduces 
(partial stabilization) price variability or uncertainty. The estimates show that these gains 
are not significant enough to outweigh the fall in mean surplus. In aggregate, these gains 
are sum to zero since it is essentially risk transfers from consumers and producers to 
taxpayers so that the domestic welfare changes originated from the fall in the mean surplus.   
In line with the general notion of superiority of free trade over restricted trade regarding 
welfare, I found that tariff instrument reduces aggregate domestic welfare for both schemes. 
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By aggregating the welfare changes of consumers, producers and taxpayers the final 
welfare changes are exactly the deadweight loss from the distortionary tariff. It comprises 
consumption and production inefficiency which is equal to the potential welfare gain 
whenever a free trade is allowed. The average welfare loss over the five-year period is 0.18 
per cent and 0.1 per cent of the total domestic value of consumption for complete 
stabilization and partial stabilization scheme respectively.   
The hypothetical complete stabilization scheme is used as a comparison to the partial 
scheme in measuring the welfare impacts of rice trade policy. It is clear that the magnitude 
effect of complete stabilization is costly to domestic welfare than the partial stabilization 
scheme. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis suggests that the partial stabilization scheme 
may result in net welfare gain if the risk benefits are large enough to offset the fall in mean 
surplus. This is possible under particular circumstances when the demand and supply are 
prices inelastic as well as the relatively high value of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion that makes the welfare effects positive for consumers and producers. However, 
still, the aggregate welfare effects would be negative. Accordingly, I do not argue that 
partial stabilization scheme is preferable to complete stabilization. Instead, I oppose both 
schemes on welfare grounds.  
However, there are some limitations in this study. First, it comes from the nature of partial 
equilibrium analysis. I ignore the related market effects of the trade policy instruments that 
makes the welfare effects are only from rice sector and linearity assumption on the demand 
and supply schedules. Second, as I work with the uncompensated welfare measure, the 
estimates are monetary measures of utility which are reliable only if the marginal utility of 
income of individuals is independent of price changes. This makes the welfare estimates are 
an approximation of the true welfare changes of price commodity stabilization scheme. 
Thus, the author leaves an extension to general equilibrium analysis for further work. 
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Appendix  
A. Surplus variance under complete price stabilization 
(In these calculations we are assuming that H L    ) 
A.1. Consumers 
Without the scheme: 
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The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
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In the presence of complete stabilization scheme we have
H Lp p
x x x  . Therefore, 0CS  .
 A.2. Producers 
Without the scheme: 
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The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
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k d j
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  
    
In the presence of complete stabilization scheme we have
H Lp p
y y y  . Therefore, 
0PS  . 
(Note: It is true that c f and a d using H L  and linearity assumption of the supply 
and demand functions).  
A.3. Taxpayers 
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In the absence of stabilization scheme there are neither subsidy payments nor tariff revenue, 
therefore mean and variance of the surplus is zero. When there is a stabilization scheme, we 
have: 
   
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The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
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A.4. Domestic surplus 
Without scheme: 
   
 
2 22
2 2
2 2
( )
S H L
H L
H L
x y b x y d f x y d e f x y d f
b d f e
e e
  
 
 
               
    
 
 
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
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With the scheme: 
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The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
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A.5. Covariance in risk term of the welfare equation 
In aggregate welfare measure, the risk term is: 
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2 2 2
0 0
2 2 2 2 2
0
1 1
( ( ))
2 2
1
( 2 )
2
R R
m x y
I I
R
x xy y
I
 
  
   
     
Let 0 0
1 1
;
2 2
p C
R R
y x
I I
      
, the risk term becomes: 
( )( ) ( )
C C P P
C P C P C P
x y x y
x y m m m
       
     
   
           
This is the risks term as a result of the interaction between the three agents in the economy 
when we aggregate the welfare of each individual (group). However, we assume that there 
is no insurance market in which these agents can trade their risks.  
B. Surplus variance under partial price stabilization 
Table 4a Computation of changes in domestic surplus under partial rice price stabilization 
Agent Surplus-Without scheme Surplus-With scheme Change 
Consumers:    
At Hp  ( )x j a b    2 2 2( )x j a b    1 1 1( )j a b    
At Lp  ( )x k d e f     1 1 1 1( )x k d e f     2 2 2 2( )k d e f     
Mean x c x f    2 1x c x f    1 2c f    
S.D. j b a   1 1 1j b a   2 2 2( )j b a    
Producers:    
At Hp  ( )y j a   2 2( )y j a   1 1( )j a   
At Lp  y k  1y k  2k  
Mean y a y d    2 1y a y d    1 2a d    
S.D. j  2 1j j  2 1j j   
Tax payers:    
At Hp  
0 
1( )h b i    
w  
At Lp  
0
 ( )x y z    ( )x y z    
Mean 0
 z x  z x  
S.D. 0
 x y y z    x y y z    
 
Table 5a Computation of the changes in domestic surplus under partial rice price 
stabilization 
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Net 
Changes 
Surpluses-Without 
scheme 
Surpluses-With scheme Change 
At Hp  x y b   2 1( )x y b h b i      ( )h i   
At Lp  x y d e f     
1 1 1( ) ( )x y d e f x y z
x y d e f l m
      
        
( ) ( )l m h i    
 
Mean 
x y a c
x y d f
  
   
 x y a c h i      ( )h i   
S.D. e  e  0 
 
B.1. Consumers 
Without scheme: 
   
2 22
2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
CS H L
H L
x j a b x c x k d e f x f
j b k d e
  
 
            
     
 
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
( ) ( )
2( )
CS j b k d e
j b a
j b a
  

    
  
    
With scheme: 
   
2 22
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
2 2 1 1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
CS H L
H L
x j a b x c x k d e f x f
j b k d e
  
 
            
     
 
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( )
2( )
CS j b k d e
j b a
j b a
  

    
  
    
B.2. Producers  
Without scheme: 
   
 
2 22
22
2 2
( )
( )
PS H L
H L
H L
y j a y a y k y a
j k a
j j
  
 
 
        
   
  
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Assuming that H L  , the partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
PS j j
j
   

  
With scheme: 
   
 
2 22
2 2 2 1 1
22
2 1 1
2 2
2 1
2 2
2 2
( )
( )
PS H L
H L
H L
H L
y j a y a y k y d
j k a
j j
j j
  
 
 
 
        
   
  
 
 
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
2 2
2 1
PS j j
j j
   
 
 
B.3. Taxpayers 
Similar to complete stabilization condition, in the absence of the scheme the surplus 
variance is zero. 
With the scheme: 
2 2 2
1
2 2
2 2
( ( ) ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
S H L
H L
H L
b h i z x y z z
y z x y
y z z y
  
 
 
        
    
   
 
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
( ) ( )S z y z y
z y x y
     
     
B.4. Net surplus variance under partial price stabilization: 
Without scheme:
  
   
 
2 22
2 2
2 2
( )
S H L
H L
H L
x y b x y a c x y d e f x y d f
b a c e
e e
  
 
 
               
    
   
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
S e e
e
   
  
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With scheme: 
22
22
12
2
2
12
2
)()(
}{}{
}{
}{
ecba
cafedcabb
ihcayxmlfedyx
ihcayxibhbyx
LH
LH
L
HS








 
The partial derivative of this variance with respect to  yields: 
S e e
e
   
  
C. The formula derivation of welfare changes from commodity price 
stabilization: 
The Taylor series expansion over the indirect utility function gives us expression for non-
stabilized utility as: 
21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
q qqEV q V q V E q q V E q q     , and  
21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
t tt
EV t V t V E t t V E t t      
for utility with stabilization scheme. 
Where, ( ) ( ) 0E q q E t t    and 2 2( ) qE q q   ;
2 2( ) tE t t   . Thus, as the consumers 
are receiving benefit from stabilization scheme, we approximate the risk benefit by using: 
( ) ( ) IEV q EV t V B   
B is the amount of utility in dollar term that the consumers are willing to pay (or require as 
compensation when 0B  ) for reduced price variability. It is the utility converted into 
money income unit by the marginal utility of income IV . 
The partial derivative of indirect utility function gives us: 
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0
( )
( )
q I
I
I
I
V V x
q
V y x
V m

 

 
 
 
The second derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price and income are: 
0
0qq Iq I
m
V V m V
q

  

, and 
0
0qI II I
m
V V m V
I

  

. 
After ignoring the second order term as it is close to zero, we have: 
2
0qq IIV V m  
The similar approach for the stabilized utility gives us: 
2
0IItt
V V m . 
After substitution, we can solve B as: 
2 2
2 2 2 2
0 0
2 2 2
0
0
2 2 2
0
0
1 1
( ) ( ) { ( ) ( ) }
( ) ( ) 2 2
1
( ) ( ) 2 ( )
( ) ( ) 1
( )
2
( ) ( ) 1
( )
2
qqtt
I I
II II qt
I I
qt
I
qt
I
V t V E t t V q V E q q
EV t EV q
B
V V
V t V q
V m V m
V V
V t V q R
m
V I
V t V q R
m
V I
 
 
 
    

 

  

  

  
 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion (R): 
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Under assumption that individuals are risk averse, uncertainty will make the expected 
utility from random outcome of income is lower than the utility generated from certain 
level of income. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) defined the measure of this risk aversion 
behaviour as the curvature of the utility function. The coefficient of relative risk aversion 
for an indirect utility function defined as: 
0
II
I
V
R I
V
 , where 
( , )
I
V p I
V
I



 and
2
2
( , )
II
V p I
V
I



. 
D. The general equilibrium model of welfare changes from commodity 
price stabilization: 
The maximization problem faced by the consumers in the economy is: 
Max ( )h hEU x  (a) 
s.t. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
h h h h hq x q x p y L I      (b) 
1,...,h h h h hs s s s s s s s sq x q x p y L I S        (c)  
Where, each term in these expressions are summarized in the table below. 
Terms Definition 
0( ) ( ) ( )
h h h h
s ss
EU x U x U x     Is a Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function with   
being the rate of time preference which measures the 
impatience ( 0 1  ). 
0
hx ,
h
sx  
Vectors of consumption bundles of T fully traded and N 
non-traded goods under small country assumption in the 
current period (0) and each state (s) period respectively. 
0
hx ,
h
sx  
Vectors of endowment of N non-traded goods in the current 
period (0) and each state period (s) respectively. 
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0
hy ,
h
sy  
Vectors of domestic net output of T and N goods by private 
firms in competitive market. 
0
hL ,
h
sL  
Part of consumers’ income which come from the lump-sum 
transfer from the government budget in the current period 
(0) and each state period (s) respectively. 
0q , sq  Vector of domestic consumer prices of the N+T goods in 
the current period (0) and each state period (s) respectively. 
0p , sp  Vector of domestic consumer prices of the N+T goods in 
the current period (0) and each state period (s) respectively. 
 
The aggregate welfare changes are solved, using a Bergson-Samuelson individualistic 
Social Welfare Function (SWF) of: 
1 2( , ,..., )HW EV EV EV   (d) 
Where 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( , )
h h h h
s s ss
EV q I V q I V q I    is the indirect utility function which solves 
the individual consumer’s maximization problem similar to maximization problem above. 
Totally differentiate the indirect utility function and using first order conditions for 
consumer maximization problem16, we have: 
0 0 0 0 0 0
0
( )h h h h hsss
h
dW dI x dq dI x dq

  

 
    
 
    (e) 
With 0
h h
h
W
EV
 



is the distributional weights and 
0
( )s



is the stochastic discount 
factor. Then, we can solve this welfare change expression using the budget constraints of 
(b) and (c), where: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
h h h h hdI x dq p dy y dp dL      (b.1) 
                                                             
16 0
0
h
h
h
EV
I
 

; 0 0
0
h
h hEV x
q
  

;
h
h
h s
s
EV
I
 

and 
h
h h
s s
s
EV x
q
  

 with 0
h and hs are 
the multipliers in the budget constraint. 
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h h h h h
s s s s s s s sdI x dq p dy y dp dL      (c.1). 
After substituting (b.1) and (c.1) and using price-tax relationship of a specific commodity 
tax of dp dq dt  , we have: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
{( ) ( )
(( ) ( ) )}
h h h h h h h h
h
h h h h h h hs
s s s s s s s s s ss
dW dx dy x dp x x dt p dy dL
dx dy x dp x x dt p dy dL
 

  

      
      


  (f) 
In a conventional Harberger analysis when 1h   we have the welfare change measures as 
the sum of monetary unit changes in private surplus is: 
0 0 0 0
0
( )ss s s s s
s
dW m d y dt dL m d y dt dL

   

          (g) 
When we consider a stabilization scheme that only uses a tariff to raise domestic price and 
isolate three separate groups: consumers (D), producers (S) and taxpayers (T) and assign 
the same distributional weight for each group agents we have equation (h): 
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
D D D D S S S S D D S S T T
s s s ss s s s
D D D S S S D D S S T T
D Ss s s s s s s s s
s s ss s s s s s
D S
D Ss s
s ss s
p p LdW
x y x x y x g g g
d
x y x p x y x p Lg g g
i i i
m m
i i
    
   
  
 
  
 
  
         
  
       
  
     
 
 
   
  
 
where 0/ 1/ (1 )s s si     is the discount facto in each state. If we ignore related market 
effects and assume consumers have no endowments of rice and produce none of it, while 
producers consume none of it, the welfare changes can be simplified as: 
( )
1 1 1
D S D D S S T T
D Ss s s
s s s ss s s s s
x y LdW g g g
d i i i
  
 
 
 
   
   
      (i) 
This is simply the approach that I use in this study. It is essentially the model in Newbery 
and Stiglitz who adopt mean-variance preferences by taking a Taylor series expansion 
around the indirect expected utility function. They ignore the related market effects, the 
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changes in tariff revenue and assume all variability in rice price is non-diversifiable market 
risk. 
